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ABSTRACT 
There are currently no access control methods to permit personnel, such as military 
members, government agencies, or first-responders, access to restricted resources and 
applications that are only available when certain conditions are satisfied.  Such conditions 
include user authentication, authorized geographic locations, and connections to specific 
base transceiver stations or base station controllers.  This work defines mobile security 
enclaves, which are designed to provide this access control, are adaptable and compatible 
with mobile cellular infrastructures, and can operate without being connected to a 
dedicated back-end network.  The goal of this proposed architecture is to permit users 
who satisfy specific pre-conditions access to resources and applications to which they 
otherwise normally would not be granted access.  An example where this research is 
beneficial is during crisis response.  Disasters require first responders the need to have 
immediate access to resources available in a specific location.  Another example is 
agencies requiring mobile communication device use on classified networks or to access 
classified resources.  These mobile security enclaves not only provide strict security by 
authenticating the user and device location, they also prevent access to networks or 
resources outside of authorized areas and restrict unauthorized users. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The past decade has brought many natural disasters and times of strife requiring 
the quick response of emergency personnel, also known as first responders.  The first 
responders have been tasked with many different jobs, such as flood evacuations, aiding 
tornado victims, and setting up and managing aid stations in earthquake-ravaged 
countries, to name just a few examples.  These examples are endless when considering 
quick response actions required of law enforcement and the military, fire departments and 
medical staffs, and many other organizations.  The coordination and communication of 
these great missions are largely complicated and often difficult to manage, yet extremely 
important. 
The current generation of wireless networks and services can support the 
coordination and communication requirements of such missions.  There has been an 
explosion in the mobile device technologies recently and an even greater advancement of 
the capabilities of these devices.  First responders can benefit from these advances by 
using them within secure wireless networks to aid in their efforts.  Security is a necessity 
in these environments and although many mechanisms are currently available for the 
networks themselves, they are not sufficient enough to secure an application to the native 
device.   
A. SECURE ENCLAVES 
Valuable services and resources must be available to first responders on-scene.  
These are often just applications, and must be secure enough to not only share sensitive 
data without compromise but also prevent unauthorized access.  Wireless networks 
currently do an acceptable job with providing security, but there also needs to be a secure 
form of access control between the user’s mobile device and applications or data. 
A mobile security enclave is a method of access control between a collection of 
valuable assets and the mobile device.  The enclave contains these assets and only allows 
access to the user when certain conditions exist.  The conditions must be specific to the 
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user and device, such as connection to particular cell tower or present within a 
geographical area.  These conditions relate directly to users who often operate with 
mobile ad-hoc networks.  These types of networks should also provide additional security 
and present solutions when the permanent infrastructure has been damaged or 
inaccessible.  There are currently no mobile security enclaves in use. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
Our goal is to develop an infrastructure for mobile security enclaves.  The 
infrastructure will consist of an application to test appropriate conditions under which 
access should or should not be granted, a method of authentication between the 
application and mobile device, and the framework required to allow the access from 
device to sensitive assets (the enclave).  The following components of the framework will 
be presented: 
• The testing application is the first instance of allowing secure access to the 
enclave.  It tests whether or not the mobile device is currently connected to 
a specific base station.  If the test is positive, then the authentication 
between the security enclave and mobile device may begin.  Further work 
will be conducted with other conditions, such as proper GPS coordinates 
of the device.   
• A method of authentication between the enclave and mobile device is 
proposed.  Various schemes are considered, such as a shared key 
mechanism, to allow for mutual authentication.   
• Once the device and enclave are authenticated, assets within the enclave 
are available to the user.  A method of building the enclave is also 
proposed to include the Android coding required.  
C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides a brief introduction to the proposed work surrounding security 
enclaves.  The introduction includes a short description of what enclaves are and what 




Chapter II provides the reader a description of technologies and concepts used and 
discussed in this work.  The topics range from very broad concepts to precise definitions.  
This chapter gives the reader a general understanding of the areas of work and focuses on 
the relevant aspects. 
Chapter III examines the necessary framework required to meet the objectives.  It 
covers requirements for the application and concepts, and explains what each component 
must accomplish.  This chapter will also discuss a generalized architecture for providing 
location-verification of the device, how to incorporate the authentication, and how to 
design the enclave. 
Chapter IV explains the architecture from Chapter III in detail as to how it works 
and how it is to be implemented.  There are three main sections to this chapter, to include 
the location-verification application, authentication mechanism, and security enclave.  
The location-verification application is implemented and the code is included in the 
Appendices.  The first section explains the code used and how it relates to the remaining 
work.  The next two sections provide a detailed description of how the authentication 
mechanism and enclave needs to be developed. 
Chapter V is the summary of the thesis with conclusions drawn from the testing as 
well as proposed frameworks.  The chapter also outlines future follow-up work necessary 
to put these concepts into a working solution and other components that can be added or 
altered to provide further functionality. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter prepares the reader for follow-up discussions presented in 
subsequent chapters.  It provides a general background and description of cellular 
communication networks and an analysis of the existing architectures of the relationships 
between applications, mobile devices, and networks.  The discussion begins with basic 
cellular network operation and components, continues with GSM and related functions, 
and concludes with information about the proposed frameworks for mobile security 
enclaves defined in Chapters III and IV. 
B. CELLULAR NETWORKS AND GSM 
The need for a wireless infrastructure to support communications and data 
interactions is now more important than ever with the increased use of mobile devices.  
Although the massive growth in mobile devices has only occurred recently, the concept 
and technology has been around for many decades.  There is much history behind the 
evolution of the cellular networks including the current 3G networks (quickly upgrading 
to 4G); however, this chapter only discusses the emergence of the Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM), since it is the only network used as a test-bed by this 
thesis. 
The basic components of a cellular network are similar regardless of which 
device, type of network, or service provider is being used.  The back-end of any network 
is the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), which extends out to the Network 
Subsystem (NSS) that contains the Mobile Switching Centers (MSC), among many other 
components.  MSCs connect to each other and Base Station Subsystems (BSS) that each 
contain a Base Station Controller (BSC) attached to at least one Base Transceiver Station 
(BTS), or cell tower.  The towers are the components that reach out and “talk” to the 
mobile devices through the over-the-air interface.  These components are discussed more 
in depth for GSM networks only (Figure 1), following a brief background of GSM. 
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Figure 1.   GSM network architecture (From [1]) 
GSM started out as The Groupe Special Mobile in 1982 by the European 
Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT).  The purpose of 
this group was to develop a standard for a mobile telephone system that could be used 
across Europe.  Five years later, 13 other countries in Europe committed to deploying 
GSM [2].  The first GSM network infrastructure was implemented in 1991, as well as the 
first GSM-based call being made.  The number of Global GSM subscribers in 1995 
exceeded 10 million, 100 million in 1998 [3] and projected to be more than 4.5 billion in 
late 2012 [4].  The global GSM market share as of 2010 is 83.5% [5]. 
The use of mobile telephony devices in a network such as GSM is made possible 
by the PSTN.  This is the core infrastructure used worldwide to connect all devices and 
networks together.  It is a massive interconnection of circuit-switched telephone 
networks.  The cellular network is one such telephone network.  An example of how the 
PSTN connects a call from one device to another is listed below. 
The GSM Network Subsystem (also known as the Network Switching Subsystem 
or NSS, or GSM Core Network) connects the PSTN to the BSS and contains the 
following elements: Home Location Register (HLR), Visitor Location Register (VLR), 
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Authentication Center (AuC), Equipment Identity Register (EIR) and the MSC.  The 
main roles of the NSS are acting as a switching center and mobility management.  The 
HLR is a database that contains a subscriber’s basic information, such as identification 
and home network.  Similar to the HLR is the VLR that contains the current location 
information of the user to be used in tracking the device and roaming.  The MSC is the 
node responsible for end-to-end routing of voice calls, text messages, and other data 
services.  It is connected directly to the other components, as well as the BSS and PSTN. 
The AuC authenticates a subscriber’s Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) when the 
subscriber’s handset attempts to connect to the NSS.  The SIM is explained in more detail 
below.  Lastly, the purpose of the EIR is to monitor and track stolen mobile devices by 
their International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI).  An IMEI number is submitted to 
the EIR, which maintains a list of stolen mobile device IMEI that are monitored for 
presence on GSM networks. 
Base Station Subsystems handle traffic between the mobile devices (also referred 
to as mobile communication devices, or MCDs) and the NSSs.  Each BSS contains a 
BSC and one or more BTS’s.  In most networks the BSC will be surrounded by multiple 
BTS’s creating a pattern of cellular coverage, a “cell.”  The BSC extracts signal 
measurements used in BTS handoffs and controls radio channels.  The BTS simply 
contains the equipment used for transmitting and receiving radio signals. 
GSM networks contain two separate channels by which mobile device users 
connect.  These are an administration (control) channel and data transfer channel, which 
itself is comprised of various sub-channels.  GSM networks are allotted a frequency 
range, which is broken down into these channels, eight in all.  To avoid frequency 
overlap, the BTSs will divide their area of coverage up into sections.  This also aids in 
mobile device handoff as it moves from cell to cell.  BTSs in GSM networks 
continuously transmit RF signals on a control frequency for MCDs to detect while mobile 
stations are continuously scanning the forward control channel (FCC) for paging signals 
from base stations.   
The MCD, BSS and MSC are the components that primarily handle phone calls 
and text messaging.  When a MSC receives a request for a connection to a mobile station 
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in its area, it sends a broadcast message to all base stations under its control.  The 
message contains the number of the mobile station that is being called.  The base stations 
then broadcast the message on all forward control channels.  The correct mobile station 
acknowledges the page by identifying itself over the reverse control channel (RCC).  The 
MSC receives the acknowledgement via the base station and instructs the base station and 
mobile station to switch to an unused voice channel.  A control message is then 
transmitted over the forward voice channel, which instructs the mobile phone to ring [6].  
The mobile device measures signal strength of all detected signals and relays this 
information to the MSC which will calculates whether or not to hand the MCD over to 
another BTS or BSC. 
The method is very similar when the mobile device initiates the call instead of 
from the other side of the MSC.  The MCD sends a request to its BTS, which is relayed 
through to the BSC.  The BSC routes the request to the MSC, which decides on whether 
or not it needs to forward the request to a connected BSS, another MSC, or to the PSTN. 
The inherent design of cellular networks leads to security problems since tower to 
mobile device communications are transmitted in the wireless medium, where 
eavesdroppers can intercept the signals.  GSM offers security by encrypting this link with 
special ciphers.  The ciphers used for encryption are integrated into the MCD as a 
dedicated piece of silicon.  The cipher key is derived by the SIM during the 
authentication process.  To authenticate a SIM, the network has to know its identity.  As 
this has to be sent over the air interface, temporary identities are used to counteract the 
threat of tracing the user’s whereabouts [7]. 
It is important to note here the potential weaknesses in the over-the-air interface 
of data transfer between the MCD and BTS.  This is one valid concern leading to the 
development of a mobile security enclave for first responders.  This interface provides 
some security, but our proposed enclave would provide a more sufficient means of 
securing access and data transfer. 
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1. Core Network Communication 
Configuring the core network at the MSC can be a difficult task depending on 
what equipment the first responders are using.  This cannot be done on a permanent GSM 
network without the system’s approval, but other means are available for testing purposes 
as well as implementation.  There exist mobile base stations that can perform many of the 
same functions as the BSC and MSC, and some allow back-end connection to the 
permanent infrastructures.  First responders can use these mobile base stations to set up 
their own networks on the fly, similar to mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), but are 
different in protocol.  This thesis references mobile networks but they are not to be 
confused with MANETs.  Mobile networks allow users to communicate and transfer data 
via GSM devices as though they are present within a permanent network.  The benefit to 
the mobile BSC/MSC combination is that they can easily be configured and sufficient 
security methods can be applied.  There also exists open source software that allows for 
the configuration of components of a GSM network if the equipment is not capable. 
One such example of open source software is OpenBSC.  The OpenBSC project is 
a software program that benefits researchers in three ways [8]: 
• provides for a low-cost test-bed for experimentation and security research 
with GSM 
• the project documents and publicizes any security related issues that are 
found 
• researchers learn more about GSM networks on a lower level, particularly 
the practical aspects with real-world equipment 
The only requirements for OpenBSC are the software program, a GSM BTS and a 
Linux kernel with mISDN support.  The software program must be written in C99 
portable code.  C99 is a standardization of the previous revisions and extensions of the C 
programming language leading up to 1999 [9]. 
There are different modes within this program that implement and act as the BSC, 
MSC and HLR.  With the required equipment, one is able to setup up a configurable 
GSM network for testing and researching purposes.  The project also provides 
functionality for use of AuCs, VLRs and EIRs.  The HLR is a simple instance of an 
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SQLite database that stores entries of the subscribers to the network.  OpenBTS is a 
similar program to that of OpenBSC, but replaces the NSS from the BTS up.  The 
purpose is to provide a software based GSM access point for GSM compatible devices.  
In addition to software, there are whole components that can be used in manually 
configuring GSM network components.  These devices are discussed further in Chapter 
IV. 
Some of the focus in this thesis centers on interaction between the MS and BSS.  
There exists a possibility to manage this interaction from the MSC.  The MSC’s purpose 
is linking groups of BSSs and to control call signaling and processing, among other 
things.  The important aspect is the data transfer through the BSS, intended for 
components such as the HLR, VLR and EIR, which is necessary for location 
management. 
One such data transfer occurs in mobility management.  BTSs are periodically 
broadcasting cell identities to their areas of coverage.  Any MCDs within that area of 
coverage receive that information and relay it to the VLR that is attached to the local 
MSC, where it calculates signal strengths for other uses, such as handoff.  This new 
location data is sent from the VLR to the mobile device’s own HLR via the MSC to 
update it.  The HLR will then send data to the old VLR instructing it to delete the old 
location info (typically a different MSC) as well as sending the user’s service profile to 
the new VLR, again through the MSC of focus.  The data stored in the VLR consists of 
the International Mobile Subscriber’s Identity (IMSI), authentication data, Mobile 
Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN/MSIDSN) number, GSM services 
that the subscriber is allowed access to and the HLR address of the subscriber. 
2. Base Station Subsystem 
The BSS’s overall responsibilities include: handling traffic and signaling between 
the MCD and MSC, encoding of speech channels, allocation of radio channels to MCDs, 




respectively, to the BSC and BTS combination.  As with the MSC, it is important to 
focus on the data transfer between the MCD and BSS to determine possible 
authentication or access control schemes. 
There is a significant amount of data that travels through the BSC to other BTSs 
and the MSC.  The focus here is how to manipulate that information to develop an 
appropriate scheme.  Other traffic, such as telephone calls and SMS traffic, is ignored for 
this work.  Rather, information that is inherent to the BSC or MCD is the focus and is 
primarily identification and location related.  One important example of this is BSC 
identification.  This identification, otherwise known as the Cell ID, is continuously being 
broadcast on the broadcast control channel (BCCH) of each BTS [10].  The Cell ID, 
received by each MCD that is within range, corresponds to that BTS/BSC pair and can be 
used for updating location and other functions.  There are other types of identification 
being broadcast, as well, such as the Location Area Identity (LAI), neighboring cell 
information, beacon frequencies, and minimum received signal strengths. 
The LAI involves location updating and identification of the MCD.  This is a 
combination of the Mobile Country Code (MCC), the Mobile Network Code (MNC), and 
the Location Area Code (LAC).  Each of these numbers represents a specific location in 
the network.  The first time the MCD is powered up it compares the stored LAI in the 
SIM to the LAI being broadcast by the BTS.  If they are different, the MCD will update 
its location through the BSC to the VLR, and further up the network to the MSC if the 
MCD is being served by a different VLR [11].  The LAI is part of the International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)/Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI). 
Another responsibility of the BSS in GSM networks is that of security.  There is 
the potential for compromise of data traffic between the MCD and BTS because of the 
over-the-air interface. An eavesdropper with the know-how can intercept a call and listen 
in on the conversation – among many different types of attacks.  There are two 
approaches to addressing this problem: 1) authentication between the MCD and MSC and 
2) data encryption between the MCD and BSS [12].  Security within GSM is discussed in 
the next section, but it is important to know that the BSS does play a minor role in this 
area. 
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3. GSM Security  
The weakest link in GSM security is the over-the-air interface between the MCD 
and the BTS.  The security model for GSM was created to battle this deficiency by 
offering a method that grants the network and users the ability to avoid sending sensitive 
identification information over this interface, such as the International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity, or IMSI [13].  There are two primary methods of securing the air interface – 
authentication and traffic encryption. 
The first step in the security mechanism is to authenticate the user.  The purpose 
behind authentication is not only for security reasons, but it also plays a role in 
identifying and locating a user in the network.  The moment a MCD attempts to connect 
to the network, data is being transmitted back and forth in attempts to identify the device, 
the user and their network permissions.  This relies on proper identification, which is only 
possible with proper authentication.  Part of the architectural design in this thesis focuses 
on the authentication for the purpose of properly identifying a user. 
An integral component in GSM for providing authentication is the Subscriber 
Identity Module (SIM).  The SIM is an integrated circuit chip fixed to a card (standard 
terminology, thus—“SIM card”) and contains subscriber information, cipher keys and 
algorithms used in encryption and authentication.  The information and secret keys are 
embedded into the chip during the personalization process with the service provider, and 
the same information and keys are distributed to the HLR/AuC.  The subscriber 
information contained within it is the IMSI, which is rarely used for security reasons; the 
TMSI is mostly used in its place.  The keys are shared cipher keys between it and the 
HLR; they are used for authentication with the MSC.  The A3 and A8 algorithm 
contained within the SIM are used for authenticating the MCD to the MSC and for 
specific sessions, respectively.  The A5 algorithm is used for encryption. 
Authentication is possible through the use of shared keys between the MCD and 
HLR.  The shared key, Ki, is a 128-bit key used to generate a 32-bit signed response, 
called SRES, to a random challenge, called RAND, and a 64-bit session key, Kc.  This is 
all done by the MSC using the A3 and A8 algorithm, respectively [14].  The process 
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starts with the MCD attempting to connect to the network.  The associated HLR will 
create a set of five triples, each containing a RAND, SRES to that particular RAND 
based on the Ki and a Kc based on the same Ki.  It will send these triples to the MSC to be 
used in authentication with the MCD.  The MSC sends the RAND of the first triple to the 
MCD.  The MCD will calculate the SRES with the RAND it just received from the MSC 
and its Ki and send it back to the MSC.  The MSC then compares the SRES it just 
received from the MCD to the one it received from the HLR.  If they are the same, the 
MCD is authenticated. 
Encryption occurs in a similar fashion.  Once the MCD is granted access after 
successful authentication with the MSC, it will create a session key, Kc.  This key is 
created with the A8 algorithm using the same RAND challenge it received from the MSC 
and the Ki stored in the SIM [15].  The BTS has the same Kc from the group of triples it 
received from the MSC.  Encryption over the air between the MCD and BTS occurs on 
each frame with a different keystream between the two.  This keystream is generated 
using the A5 algorithm initialized by the Kc and the number of the frame to be encrypted.   
4. MCD Applications 
Applications are computer software programs developed for the end-user.  These 
programs come in a wide variety of functions, such as games, finance assistants, and 
word processors.  These software programs can be built with as little as a few dozen lines 
of code or are as large as millions of lines.  There are many different programming 
languages with which to write applications, such as Java, C++ and Python; programmers 
need have little to no experience in writing code to develop a simple application (“app” 
for short). 
Applications are not limited to personal computers.  They have appeared in 
personal data assistants (PDAs), cell phones, portable game consoles, and smartphones.  
Essentially anything with the ability to store and execute code can run an application.  
Smartphone applications have taken over the digital world with the advent of their 
“pocket-sized” computers.  As of 2011, application downloads for the more popular 
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devices (Google & Apple) have exceeded the ten billion mark [16].  Some platforms 
classes are even seeing millions of downloads in a single day. 
C. ANDROID’S APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES (API)  
Android is a software stack for mobile devices used to execute applications.  It 
contains an operating system (OS), middleware and key applications.  Furthermore, there 
exists a software development kit (SDK) that contains the necessary libraries and 
application programming interfaces (APIs) for writing applications for Android devices.  
Figure 2 displays the overall Android architecture and the specific components are 
described on the Android Developer’s website [17]. 
Figure 2.   Android architecture (From [17]) 
An Application Programming Interface (API) is a set of programming instructions 
that allow software programs to communicate with one another.  The API for a system or 
program represents a method for others to access the information its system or program 
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contains.  For example, if one was looking to develop a website that pulls information 
from other sites such as weather, news and sports updates, to display it on one’s own site, 
they would need the APIs for those specific sources.  The APIs give the developer the 
tools necessary to access the information and use it.  An example related to mobile 
devices is an application that displays the latitude and longitude of the device’s current 
position.  The location-based application will use the device’s APIs to retrieve the 
coordinates for display.  
The Android SDK contains the Android OS APIs.  This collection of APIs allows 
developers to create applications for Android OS devices.  Many of the APIs are open to 
the public and give access to services such as basic telephony data, location specific 
information (which is used in this thesis), and GSM and CDMA functions.  Others are 
closed to the public and need special permissions for use, or are strictly controlled by the 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). 
D. LOCATION-BASED APPLICATIONS 
The global positioning system (GPS) is being put to use in many different facets 
of technology.  It is embedded within automobiles and dashboard-mounted navigation 
units.  GPS receivers have been incorporated in wristwatches for runners and bikers.  
GPS also made an appearance in the early years of the cell phones.  Currently, many 
smartphone applications depend upon pulling a MCD’s GPS coordinates for use in 
gaming, shopping, social networking, geo-locating, and so on. 
Numerous applications (also known as Location Based Services—LBSs) for 
mobile devices rely on or utilize the location of the device, which can be found through a 
few different methods.  As mentioned above, tracking a MCD is relatively easy to do 
from the network by use of the MSC and VLR.  Both of these components contain 
location information about the device, specifically the BSS that the device is connected 
to.  Knowing this information, the device can be found by knowing in which cell the 
device is located.  This narrows down the search and the precision is limited only by the 
size of the cell.  Other methods include using localization or triangulation of BTSs and 
signal strengths.  A third method is by using a GPS receiver, which is embedded in the 
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phone. The LBSs are implemented by applications written for the device.  Another 
example of an application that queries for location information is one that checks for the 
Cell ID.  Every BTS has an area of coverage, called a cell, and an identity.  The area of 
coverage is the extent of the geographic range that a MCD can make a reliable 
connection to the BTS within.  The Cell ID is a unique number assigned to each BTS or 
sector (cell) of that BTS.  This data is used when the MCD periodically sends signal 
strength and connection quality data to the MSC where it is calculated for handoff 
determination [18].  Similar to the location based Java classes mentioned above, there are 
classes that allow a developer to utilize the Cell ID of a BTS that the device is connected 
too. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduces a high-level discussion on many broad topics concerning 
mobile devices, the GSM network, and related architectures.  The aim is to provide the 
reader a basic understanding of components and concepts used in this thesis.  The general 
focus is on developing a context, or security enclave, that provides a secure method of 
connection and contains vital applications within.  The following chapters will go further 
into detail on how these topics are used.   
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III. ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a high level description of an architecture that incorporates a 
location-verification test application, authentication mechanism and the secure enclave.  
It also offers other possible combinations of components as well as discusses functions 
and interactions between the concepts, such as security and authentication.  The goal is to 
develop a working solution based off of the infrastructure in this chapter.  This 
development consists of a test application that allows authentication to occur between the 
application and mobile communications devices (MCDs), which further allows the 
enclave to be accessed.  This architecture is summarized in Figure 3. 
Figure 3.   Proposed use case 
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B. LOCATION-VERIFICATION APPLICATION 
The purpose of this initial test is to verify the user is in a particular location that is 
authorized to have access to an enclave. This test is the first part of the connection 
between the user and secure or restricted-access resources.  This section discusses two 
methods of verifying that the user is at a particular location, which will in-turn authorize 
them access.  These locations can be geographic or conditional on connections to base 
stations since each BTS has a limited range for its transmissions. 
The proposed test application is designed for the Android operating system and 
GSM network.  The Android software development toolkit (SDK) allows for applications 
to be built by using its application programming interfaces (APIs) and the Java 
programming language [19].  The Java language is object-orientated, making use of 
objects and classes, which are used in development of this test application.  For an in-
depth explanation of the Java programming language, visit Java’s on-line programming 
tutorials (http://download.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/index.html).  Additionally, specifics 
on the code, phone and base station used in testing is presented in Chapter IV.  The 
important point here is that the Android OS contains classes within its SDK that allows 
for an application to obtain the Cell ID of a base station that the MCD is connected to.  
The Android SDK also allows for access to GPS coordinates. 
The application’s operation is straightforward for the user.  The user opens the 
application on the MCD and executes a “Connect” function, which is a simple command 
that instructs the application to perform its test.  The application pulls the necessary 
information from either the base station or the GPS receiver in the MCD to determine 
authorization.  This authorization is initially written into the application during the 
programming phase, and can be only changed statically.  If the test passes, then the 
application will advance to the next portion in the architecture – authentication of the 
application to the MCD in order to connect to the enclave in a secure session.  Otherwise, 
if the test fails, then the application will just notify the user that the conditions have not 
been met.   
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The following discusses the two methods of testing in the application: 
1. Cell ID 
In this test, the application is checking to see if the MCD is connected to the 
appropriate base station.  As explained in Chapter II, each base station is assigned a 
unique identification number by the telecommunication services provider, which 
distinguishes it from others. The identification is broadcast on the broadcast control 
channel (BCCH) of each BTS, and the MCD receives this data from the BSC to which it 
is connected, so the application simply reads that ID from the MCD.  The application 
contains a function that directs further action if the Cell ID read is one of the “authorized 
IDs”.  These authorized IDs will be coded into a list within the application for cross-
referencing.  An example of the pseudocode for this test reads: 
get CELLID; 
if CELLID == 12345  
{ 
do AUTHENTICATION; 




}    
 
It is also possible to change the configurations of some mobile base stations from 
the network management level, including the Cell IDs.  Thus, this Cell ID check is not 
limited to just permanent GSM infrastructures. 
2. GPS Coordinates 
This test application obtains the GPS coordinates from the receiver in the device.  
A similar method is written to get the coordinates but instead of cross-referencing an 
authorization list, the application will perform a calculation.  An example of this would 
entail limiting access to a few city blocks.  The coordinates that outline the collection of 
authorized city blocks are written into the application.  When called upon to test a 
location, the application performs a simple calculation to determine from the users 
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current GPS coordinates, if they are within the authorized blocks.  The following 
pseudocode gives a simple example of what the calculation would be: 
get LATITUDE, LONGITUDE; 
if LATITUDE < 35.800 AND > 35.700 
{ 
 if LONGITUDE < 121.800 AND > 121.700 
 { 






}    
This method has the advantage in that GPS coordinates cannot be spoofed, unlike 
Cell IDs, but has a drawback of potentially being in a location that does not receive GPS 
signals.  This method is implemented statically and would be useful in situations where 
the authorized locations are known in advance and do not change. 
C. AUTHENTICATION OF APPLICATION TO MCD 
The purpose of the overall framework is to provide a secure method of granting 
access of vital resources and applications, contained within an enclave, to first responders 
and emergency personnel.  The section above discusses an architecture needed to provide 
the first form of security by checking location of the device.  This section discusses the 
second form of security – authentication of an application and the MCD. 
Both methods of location verification and authentication occur in the same 
application.  Once the application verifies that the MCD is in the proper location, either 
by GPS coordinates or connection to a specific BSS, then it must authenticate with the 
MCD.  This authentication provides another layer of security for access to the enclave, 
ensuring that the individual and device attempting to access the enclave is authorized.  
The authorized individuals and devices are pre-programmed into the application, can be 
pre-loaded onto a removal storage device or via another means such as accessing the 
network.  This architecture only focuses on the application containing the authorizations. 
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The primary authentication mechanism is challenge-and-response.  The 
application must challenge the user and dependent on the user response, grants access to 
the enclave.  The first component in this process must be a valid piece of identification.  
There are a few different forms of identification available to test against on a GSM-
connected MCD, to include the IMEI, ICCID, IMSI, and shared keys on the SIM cards, 
to name a few.  Each of these IDs can be retrieved with the proper coding in Android, but 
the most secure is to use the shared keys contained within the SIM card.   
In order to use this method of authentication, the application authenticates the 
user by sending a challenge to the SIM invoking a response.  The challenge is a 128-bit 
random number (RAND) and is generated by the application.  The SIM contains 
algorithms that combine a shared key, Ki, and the RAND to form a response and session 
key, Kc.  The application contains similar algorithms and with a copy of the same shared 
key, generates its own response and Kc.  Additionally, shared key and IMSI (or some 
other form of identification) matched pairings need to be stored within the device so that 
the application will know which shared key to use for the present SIM.  Authentication is 
successful when both responses match.  Once authenticated, the application will send a 
request to open the security enclave.  This request contains the challenge, the IMSI and 
the generated Kc.  This is the only way to open up the enclave. 
D. ENCLAVE STRUCTURING 
The third component to the architecture is the security enclave.  The important 
aspects of this element are strict security features that must be in place for it to be 
accessed and the fact that it contains vital resources for the users, such as applications or 
data.  The enclave is application-based as well, which offers a few different security 
methods that prevent unauthorized access.  Another benefit of being application-based is 
that updates can be sent to the devices that contain the enclave similar to that of other 
applications on the network. 
The primary aspect of the enclave is the means of opening it.  There are alternate 
means of structuring the enclave such as building it into a separate partition of the hard 
drive, developing a separation kernel for it or embedding it within an application.  This 
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work focuses on the application method.  The application will be written such that the 
only way it can be started is by a request from the authentication application above.  
Sending an intent, or coded message, from the authentication application to the enclave to 
open it, does this.  The intent contains user information, a session key and a specific 
request to start the enclave application.  The enclave will first run the A3/A8 algorithm to 
produce the Kc, similar to that generated during authentication, as described above.  It 
will compare both session keys, and if they are equivalent, will grant the enclave access 
for the user. 
Another form of security for this method that is included in the application is the 
use of developer certificates.  Restrictions can be applied within the code that forces the 
application to verify both applications (location-verification/authentication & enclave) 
contain the same developer certificate before allowing access.  This method prevents 
other applications from being granted access by sending their own requests for access to 
the enclave. 
Once the enclave is successfully opened, the user will gain access to the contents 
contained inside.  The application is written such that the user will be presented with a 
list or separate desktop on the device that contains the resources.  The coding for this will 
be similar to that of the intent transfer between the authentication and enclave 
applications.   
E. SUMMARY 
This section presented a high-level aspect of an architecture that allows access to 
a secure enclave.  The three main components of the design were outlined to include the 
location verification, authentication and the enclave. All three components are application 
based and provide a high level of security.  The next section will go further into details on 










Figure 4.   Architectural flow chart 
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This chapter describes, in detail, the three main elements of the security enclave 
architecture.  The first section presents relevant code examples with descriptions 
regarding the written and tested location-verification application.  That section explains 
how the application works and how it performs the verification.  The next two sections 
lay out the required architecture for developing the remaining two aspects of the overall 
design – authentication to the MCD and the security enclave.  Both sections contain the 
necessary building blocks for implementing the design. 
B. LOCATION-VERIFICATION APPLICATION 
The application for verifying location was written for Android devices, firmware 
version 1.6 and up.  The application was installed and tested on an Android Developer 
Phone (ADP) 2, Google’s Ion (HTC Magic).  The code was written using Eclipse, which 
is a Java Integrated Developer Environment (IDE), and it has the Android SDK starter 
packages and Android Development Tool (ADT) Plugin installed. 
LGS’s Tactical Base Station Router (TacBSR) Pico was used to represent the 
GSM network aspect.  This architecture is designed to work with any GSM configuration 
that contains GSM specific elements such as a BTS Cell ID. The TacBSR that is used 
was designed for Emergency Communications Systems (ECS) applications by providing 
an alternate GSM network for a pre-provisioned list of subscribers.  It was also designed 
for Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, allowing personnel to communicate to GSM 
users [20].  It is capable of operating as a BSS, MSC, VLR and HLR, that allows for 
manual configuration.  Its graphic user interface (GUI) allows for administrative 
functions that would be available in the network as well.  Functions specific to this thesis 
include assigning the Cell ID and verifying IMEI and IMSIs. 
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This location-verification application contains three main activities (screens): 
“Main” activity, “GPSActivity” and “CIDActivity.”  The fourth activity, “AuthActivity,” 
is just a placeholder at this point for future progress and contains minimal functionality.  
The application is accessed by selecting an icon from the list of applications on the 
device.  The application opens to the first screen (Figure 5).  This screen has two options 
for the user to select: “Get coords” and “Get CellID”.  Both options represent a means of 
verifying their present location and will take the user to the respective GPS-coordinates 
verification or Cell ID verification screen (Figure 6).  For testing purposes, these two 
activities give the option to see what the device’s current coordinates and Cell ID are.  
There is an “Authenticate” button on both of these verification activities that will take the 
user to the authentication activity.  This advance can only occur if the user is within a 
specific geographic region or connected to a specific BTS.  If neither condition is 
satisfied, the user will be unable to advance to the authentication activity.  This is the 
main function of the location-verification application; without authorized coordinates or 
Cell ID, the user is unable to authenticate, which is required to open the enclave. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Location-verification application home activity 
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Figure 6.   Location-verification application GPS and Cell ID check 
The user will advance to the authentication activity (Figure 7) when either 
condition is met.  This activity simply contains an “Authenticate” button.  This is 
required to open the enclave; the authentication mechanism will commence once the user 
depresses the button.  A message will be displayed to the user with authentication results.  
If authentication was a success, this application will send a request to open the security 
enclave.  If it was unsuccessful, a message is displayed to the user saying so.  Both the 
authentication mechanism and enclave are discussed in further sections. 
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Figure 7.   Location-verification application authentication activity 
1. Main Activity 
The Main activity (Appendix A) is the home screen for this application.  It 
contains code to provide functionality to both buttons.  The code simply consists of 
setting an OnClickListener to both buttons, which direct the application to the respective 
activity.  For example, the following code outlines the requirements for putting 
functionality to a button: 
This instantiates the buttons: 
Button gpsButton, cidButton; 
This sets a listener to the button, which ties the touch-screen actions to the code: 
gpsButton = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.gpsBtn); 
gpsButton.setOnClickListener(this); 
And finally, this conditional sets action to the depressed button: 
Button clickedBtn = (Button) v; 
  if (clickedBtn == gpsButton)  
    { 
    Main.this.startActivity(newIntent(Main.this,GPSActivity.class)); 
    } 
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The “GPSActivity.class” in the previous code represents another activity to 
open.  All buttons in the application are coded in similar fashion.  In the example code set 
above, the two buttons were built into the application such that, when depressed on the 
screen by the user, the application would advance to that specific activity. 
2. GPSActivity 
The first option from the Main activity is to verify the user’s GPS coordinates are 
authorized.  The GPSActivity (Appendix B) will open when the Get coords button is 
depressed on the Main activity.  The GPSActivity is responsible for obtaining the 
MCD’s most recent GPS coordinates and performing a calculation to verify authorized 
location.  This activity is divided into two separate actions: obtaining coordinates and 
verifying. 
Android contains a package android.location that has three classes used for 
obtaining GPS coordinates: android.location.Location, 
android.location.LocationManager and android.location.LocationProvider 
[21].  This activity creates an instance of the class LocationManager, which provides 
access to the MCD’s location services.  Once the activity has access to the location 
services, it is then able to register for requesting location updates for use in the 
application.  This allows the device to start obtaining position fixes.  Once the device has 
a fix, the activity can request the respective latitude and longitude.  This application takes 
both of these integers and displays them in a TextView, as well as using them to perform 
the calculation used in verifying location authorization.  A TextView is simply a 
placeholder for text to be displayed on the screen.  The following code outlines the major 
components for obtaining GPS fixes: 
The first step is instantiating the class for requesting device services: 
LocationManager locMgr; 
Next will be registering for and requesting location updates. The two values listed 
in the request for location update determine the minimum time (in milliseconds) and 
distance (in meters) that the application delays before obtaining a new fix: 
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locMgr = (LocationManager)getSystemService(LOCATION_SERVICE); 
locMgr.requestLocationUpdates(LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER,10000,5.0f, 
onLocationChange); 
At this point, the activity can request the last known location,  
Location loc = locMgr.getLastKnownLocation(LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER); 
and break it up into separate latitude and longitude integers: 
lat = loc.getLatitude(); 
lon = loc.getLongitude(); 
Displaying these onto the screen requires outputting them to a TextView: 
TextView myView1 = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.Latitude); 
myView1.setText("" + lat); 
The second part of this activity is verifying the user’s location.  This requires a set 
of GPS coordinates as boundaries of an authorized area.  These boundaries are written 
into the code by the developer.  The activity performs the calculation when the user clicks 
the “Authenticate” button on the screen.  The activity will obtain the last known latitude 
and longitude values and compare them against the input boundaries.  If the user is within 
the boundaries, then the application will allow the user to access the authentication 
activity.  If the user is not within the boundaries, the activity will display an error 
message to the user stating that condition.  An example of the calculations is as follows 
(“lat” and “lon” are the current latitude and longitude coordinates, the others, such as 
“NWlat,” are manually input authorized coordinates by the developer or organization): 
if ((lat < NWlat) && (lat < NElat) && (lat > SWlat) && (lat > SElat) && 







 GPSActivity.this.finish( ); 
} 
If the user is not within the authorized boundaries, the activity will shut down and send 
the user back to the Main activity, otherwise they will be advanced to the GPSActivity. 
In addition to the few examples of code above and Appendix A, there are a few 
other components that are needed for this activity to work – entries in the “manifest” file 
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and the xml code.  The xml for this activity is straightforward and can be referenced in 
Appendix C.  Both permissions are needed within the manifest file to allow the 
application to obtain network and location information [22].  The following is an example 
of this portion of the manifest file: 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" /> 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_COURSE_LOCATION" /> 
The manifest file can be referenced in Appendix D. 
3. CIDActivity 
The second option of the Main activity will take the user to the CIDActivity 
(Appendix E).  Like the GPSActivity, the first option is to present the user with the 
current network information, such as the Cell ID and Location Area Code (LAC).  The 
LAC in this case is for testing purposes only.  The Cell ID, if one is available, will be 
displayed in the proper format; otherwise the application will notify the user there is no 
connection.  Also similar to the GPSActivity, there is an “Authenticate” button, which 
directs the user to the authentication mechanism as long as the MCD is connected to an 
authorized Cell ID.   
Android contains two packages containing classes that allow the programmer to 
obtain network information, such as the Cell ID.  These packages are 
android.telephony and android.telephony.gsm.  Each contains the required classes 
of android.telephony.TelephonyManager and 
android.telephony.gsm.GsmCellLocation, classes respectively.  Similar to the GPS 
location request in the GPSActivity, the activity must request services of the phone to 
access this network data.  This is done so by:  
TelephonyManager tm = (TelephonyManager) getSystemService(TELEPHONY_SERVICE); 
This allows access to the following class and an instantiation of it to be used for 
data retrieval: 
GsmCellLocation loc = (GsmCellLocation) tm.getCellLocation(); 
Within this class is the method that retrieves the Cell ID from the MCD: 
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cellID = loc.getCid(); 
The remaining portions of this first function in the activity consist of displaying 
this data to a TextView for the user. 
The second portion of the activity is whether or not to allow the user to advance to 
the authentication mechanism.  The application should only allow this to occur if the user 
is connected to an authorized Cell ID.  The list of authorized Cell IDs is written into the 
code or can be stored elsewhere such as the back-end network.  These IDs will be cross-
referenced when the user depresses the “Authenticate” button to compare the current Cell 
ID to the list.  If there is a match, then the user will be directed to the AuthActivity, 
otherwise the activity will terminate.  The following is the conditional loop verifying 
authorized Cell ID, where in this example the “ID” is a constant representing where the 
true value would be checked: 
if (clickedBtn == authBtn)  
{ 
if (cellID == ID)  
{ 





 CIDActivity.this.finish( ); 
 } 
} 
The only requirement in the manifest file is the same course location access 
permission that was required by the GPSActivity as well.  The xml file can be 
referenced in Appendix F. 
4. AuthActivity 
This activity only contains a button with a notification tied to it.  The architecture 
ties this to the authentication mechanism that is discussed below.  The activity and xml 
for this can be referenced in Appendices G and H, respectively. 
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C. AUTHENTICATION OF APPLICATION TO MCD 
This section outlines the framework that is needed for the authentication 
mechanism within the application.  It must not be accessible until the above conditions 
are met, and must allow only those users that contain the authorized identifications.  
These identifications will come from the SIM and the MCD.  This application will 
authenticate the user by these identifications and establish a session key that will provide 
another layer of security when attempting to access the security enclave. 
This section is comprised of three main parts.  The first covers concepts used in 
the authentication mechanism.  The second explains the authentication algorithm used in 
the application.  The third section explains how communication to and from the SIM is 
possible.  The last section will also explain the transition from the authentication portion 
of this application to the enclave. 
1. Required Elements And Concepts 
The first concept to understand for this mechanism is the process by which 
authentication occurs between the MCD and HLR/AuC.  The general mechanism for this 
is “challenge and response.”  In review, the GSM network uses this scheme where the 
HLR/AuC is creating the challenge and the MCD (SIM, specifically) is providing the 
response.  The authentication mechanism outlined in this proposed architecture closely 
resembles that of the GSM process, but contains a few different elements. 
The components that make up the GSM authentication process are the SIM, 
MCD, BTS, BSC, VLR, MSC, HLR and AuC.  The process starts at subscription 
between a user and the service provider, when the individual user is associated to a 
Subscriber Authentication Key, Ki, along with an International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI) [23].  This Ki is stored in the SIM and on the network side in the 
Authentication Center (AuC).  In some cases, this AuC is integrated with an HLR.  The 
identity of the user or MCD must be established each time it attempts to connect to the 
network [24].  The MCD sends its Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) to the 
VLR, and possibly further to the HLR, to properly identify itself to the network.  Recall 
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that the TMSI is used instead of the IMSI in most cases as an attempt to protect the user’s 
identity when transmitting over the unsecure air-interface.  The VLR will then send an 
authentication request to the HLR/AuC to initiate the authentication process.   
This process of authenticating is based on the A3 algorithm, which occurs in the 
SIM and at the HLR/AuC.  The HLR/AuC will generate a random, non-predictable 
number, called the RAND, to be used as a challenge.  It will combine the RAND and the 
user’s Ki in the A3 algorithm to generate a Signed Response, or SRES.  The SRES and 
RAND are sent back through the network, the RAND to the SIM and SRES to the VLR.  
The SIM uses the same embedded A3 algorithm to combine the RAND that it received 
from the HLR/AuC and its Ki to generate its own SRES and a session key, Kc, used by 
the MCD for encryption.  The SIM will respond to the challenge with this SRES, and the 
two SRESs (from the SIM and HLR/AuC) are compared at the VLR.  The MCD is only 
allowed access to the network if they match.  Since only the SIM and HLR/AuC contain 
the user-specific Ki, this provides the means of authenticating the user to the network. 
2. Application-embedded Authentication Algorithm 
This mechanism closely follows that used in the GSM network.  The process 
centers on the SIM algorithms; and SRES generation is the same.  The difference is in the 
way the RAND is delivered to the SIM and the fact that the application itself is playing 
the role of the HLR/AuC.  The application will also conduct the SRES comparison 
between its own generation of the response and the SIM’s response, as was done by the 
VLR originally.  The same shared key, Ki, is being used.  The RAND and SRES are of 
the same format.  From the aspect of the SIM, everything remains the same as in a typical 
GSM network. 
The first step in this authentication scheme is the algorithm within the application.  
Both the A3 and A8 algorithms, which are used in SIM cards for authentication, are not 
publicly available, but are still in use [25].  Additionally, GSM Public Land Mobile 
Network (PLMN) managers have direct access to these algorithms because they are 
required to operate the myriad of devices on their networks [26].  This means that the 
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algorithms are still being deployed in SIMs and that there is availability for certain 
organizations to use or implement versions of A3/A8 algorithms, or other compatible 
means.  These other compatible algorithms are available to provide further security and 
exist through leaked documents, reverse engineering, and extensive cryptoanalysis on 
these secret algorithms.  One such example is shown in Appendix J.  Furthermore, the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP – www.3GPP.org), a consortium of partners who 
develop technical specifications and reports, as well as maintenance and development for 
GSM, have publications specifying the minute details of such compatible algorithms for 
A3/A8.  One of the more frequently used algorithms is the COMP128. 
COMP128 is a derived algorithm that is compatible to the A3/A8 algorithms in 
use in the GSM network [27].  Many versions of this algorithm are available for 
download across the Internet for implementation.  An example of this algorithm, 
developed by the persons who are responsible for the reverse engineering of it, is posted 
in Appendix H, coded in C.  The functionality of this algorithm requires the same SRES 
and Kc produced by its algorithm and that of the SIM.  Both will produce the same 32-bit 
SRES and 64-bit Kc.   
This process starts with the Cell ID or GPS-coordinates successfully completing 
verification and the user now having access to the “Authenticate” button.  Depressing this 
button triggers the mechanism to start.  The authentication activity will query the SIM’s 
IMSI (or MCD’s IMEI, or any other form of user identification) to cross-reference a table 
within the application to find the appropriate Ki.  This table will be programmed into the 
application, but may be accessed via other means.  Upon a successful query and table 
match-up, the activity will produce a RAND and start the authentication algorithm 
(COMP128 or other variant) with it and the Ki to output an SRES.  The activity is ready 
for the next step – polling the SIM for authentication. 
3. Communication With the SIM 
Receiving the RAND and generating the SRES, from the aspect of the SIM, 
should not change in this application scheme.  The SIM receives the command to run the 
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algorithm, uses its Ki and RAND as input, and returns the SRES.  Instead of talking to the 
network, however, the SIM is communicating indirectly with the application’s 
authentication algorithm within the associated activity.  For a clearer understanding of 
how this works, the discussion will start at the SIM and progress to the application. 
The SIM is the component in the GSM network that contains specific user 
identity and the algorithms required for authenticating them.  It contains a microcomputer 
that consists of a CPU and three types of memory [28].  The masked programmed read 
only memory (ROM) usually contains the operating system of the card, the code for the 
GSM application and the security algorithms A3 and A8.  The other types of memory, 
random access memory (RAM) and the electronically erasable programmable ROM 
(EEPROM), also take part in the authentication process by buffering data for transfer and 
storing the data, respectively.  The OS of the card controls access between the SIM and 
MCD and network.  This access is typically reading or updating the data on the card; 
reading is the access required for authentication [29]. 
Special commands are sent from the MCD to the SIM to interact for various 
functions, such as instructing it to run the authentication algorithm.  The commands are 
contained within Application Protocol Data Units (APDU).  APDUs are of two types: 
command APDUs or response APDUs [30].  The specific format is outlined by the 
International Organization for Standardization (IOS) and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standard IOS/IEC 7688.  In general, each APDU 
contains specific instructions and data for both the SIM and MCD.  In the case of 
authentication, the MCD will transmit a command APDU containing instructions to run 
the authentication algorithm and the RAND will be contained within the data portion of 
the unit.  The SIM will execute the appropriate algorithm and transmit a response APDU 
containing the SRES as part of its data unit. 
The authentication portion of the application not only creates the RAND and 
generates the SRES, it also builds the associated APDU to send to the SIM.  Proper 
constructing of the data unit is specifically outlined in the IOS/IEC 7688, in terms of 
which commands to use to invoke the SIM’s algorithm.  Sending the APDU to the SIM 
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requires APIs that are not native to Android.  These open-source APIs, specifically the 
“SmartCard API,” are available from the Secure Element Evaluation Kit for the Android 
platform (seek-for-android) [31].   
These APIs are necessary because of the location of the SIM within the 
architecture of the Android system (Figure 8).  It is connected to the baseband processor 
and the Android system runs on the application processor.  In order to communicate with 
the SIM, the baseband processor must issue AT (attention) commands.  These commands 
are defined by the 3GPP 27.007 specifications.  The AT commands, in turn, will transmit 
the necessary APDUs to the SIM (such as the command APDU and response APDU) 
[32]. 
 
Figure 8.   Android system architecture (From [30]) 
The remaining procedure for authenticating lies in the authentication activity of 
the application.  Upon receiving the response APDU, the activity will use the received 
data element, which consists of the concatenation of the SRES and Kc.  Simple parsing 
can be coded to split these two elements for SRES comparison.  With successful 
authentication, the activity reports authentication and approves access to the enclave. 
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4. Transition To Enclave 
This application, which contains both the location-verification and authentication 
functionalities, will send a request to open the enclave once authentication is successful.  
The request will contain the enclave’s specific identification, and the Kc and RAND used 
in the algorithm above. 
D. ENCLAVE STRUCTURING 
The enclave contains all the necessary resources and applications that are needed 
by first responders and other personnel for a given response situation.  Secure access to 
these elements is granted by a few different layers, some mentioned above and a few 
more yet to be discussed.  The user that wishes to access these important resources must 
first be in the authorized location, then authenticated, and a further means of 
authentication will occur for the enclave to open, but is not the only access control 
method remaining.  There are permissions built into the code that restrict the enclave 
application from even starting if an unauthorized user is attempting access. 
This section will explain the required application framework that makes up the 
enclave.  The first part discusses the communication links between the previous 
application and this one.  The second part goes into detail about the additional securities 
built within the enclave, followed by the framework that contains the other resources and 
applications.   
1. Transition From Authentication To Enclave 
Android applications contain four core components that are essential building 
blocks: activities, services, content providers, and broadcast receivers [33].  All four 
components offer the system and user (in some cases) an entry into an application.  The 
only component that is of concern for this discussion is the activity. 
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Activities are simply the individual screens that the user can interact with in the 
application.  They are independent of each other and can be accessed by other 
applications or activities.  This is how the enclave is opened from the location-
verification and authentication application.  The enclave consists of a main activity and 
its sole function is to start the enclave application, perform further authentication and 
verify permissions are appropriate.  Activities are started by using the 
startActivity(Intent) function, where the “Intent” is a way to describe which specific 
activity to start. 
The system must read the application’s manifest file before the application starts.  
This file contains all the components within the application, such as individual activities.  
Here the developer must declare the entry point into the application and specify that 
particular activity be listed in the system’s application launcher.  This is done by using 
intent filters; below is an example of how that section of the manifest file will read: 
<activity android:name=".Main" 
                  android:label="@string/app_name"> 
            <intent-filter> 
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" /> 
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" /> 
            </intent-filter> 
</activity> 
If these declarations are not in the manifest file, the application will not start when 
called explicitly by the intent [34]. 
Intents are messages used to activate the core Android components.  They are 
passive data structures that hold an abstract description of the action to be performed 
[35].  They also have the ability to carry small amounts of data.  The authentication 
portion of the previously described application utilizes an intent to start the enclave’s 
Main activity.  This intent takes the form: 




The first line initializes the intent and declares the action to take, as starting up an 
initial activity.  The second line sets a component name to the intent so the activity to be 
performed knows where to find it.  The component name has two elements – the Android 
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package name (the application name in this case) and the name of the class, or activity.  
The last line details which action needs to take place—start the activity “Main” that 
resides in the “enclave” application. 
2. Enclave Securities 
At this point, the Main activity of the enclave has opened for the user after 
successful authentication.  The enclave contains two further security functions to ensure 
that the application was not opened errantly or by unauthorized means.  The first method 
is verifying certain permissions within the manifest file.  The second method is executing 
another authentication algorithm. 
The manifest file provides another function for the enclave besides declaring its 
components to the system upon startup.  All Android applications must be signed with a 
certificate whose private key is held by the developer [36].  The purpose of this is 
distinguishing application authors.  It also provides a level of security by setting 
permissions within the application to only grant access based on this developer 
identification. 
There are four protection levels in Android: normal, dangerous, signature, and 
signature or system.  All four levels have varying degrees of security and function.  By 
setting the application to a “signature” level, the application will only open if the 
requesting application contains the same developer certificate.  Setting this level requires 
a manifest entry: 
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 
    package="com.example.enclave" > 
    <permission android:name="com.example.enclave.Main" 
 android:protectionLevel="signature" /> 
</manifest> 
The other form of security is authentication, using the authentication portion of 
the previous application.  The intent that is starting the enclave activity will contain the 
RAND that was previously generated in the SIM authentication and the resulting Kc.  The 
same algorithm used in the authentication will be used here.  The enclave needs to obtain 
the SIM identification first to determine which Ki to use, which can be queried in the 
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same fashion as before.  The difference between this instance of authentication and the 
authentication of the SIM is comparison between the session key that was generated 
instead of the SRES.  Only the application that provided the RAND along with the intent 
to start the enclave will produce a matching Kc.  Once both of these conditions are met, 
the enclave will open full access to the user. 
3. Enclave Framework 
The framework of the enclave can take the form of a list or appear as a separate 
desktop that contains the resources and applications.  The methods of accessing the 
resources and applications are similar to that of opening the enclave by selecting the 
associated titles or icons on the screen. 
It has already been shown how to code functionality into buttons that appear on 
the MCD’s screen.  Android allows this same coding to occur on any image displayed on 
the screen.  This includes icons and list elements.  Similarly, the coding has been 
discussed regarding using intents to open other activities or applications.  This is exactly 
how the enclave functions.  The user will be presented a Home activity that represents the 
enclave starting point after the two security methods have been performed.   
The Home activity can take many different forms and will contain visual 
representations of the restricted applications.  When the user selects one on the screen, 
the intent will execute per the code of the associated icon and the new application will 
open from inside the enclave application.  These applications will contain the same 
signature permission as the enclave.  There is no additional coding that is required 
beyond that which the application requires.  
The user will be directed back to the enclave application every time the current 
restricted application is closed.  Android uses the “last in, first out” stack routine to 
manage activities [37].  Current activities are paused when the user opens a new one.  




activity starts back up.  This stack mechanism is also called the “back stack.”  The 
enclave application will always be in the background, paused, when new applications are 
opened. 
E. SUMMARY 
This section presented an architecture design for implementing a mobile security 
enclave.  The design emphasizes solutions for providing security and access control to the 
enclave.  There are many layers of security and control throughout this framework to 
include location verification, user authentication and secure application-to-application 
transfer.  These layers prevent unauthorized access to the enclave as a whole.  The next 
chapter concludes this work as well as provides recommendations for future efforts on 
mobile security enclaves. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis proposes an architecture to allow personnel, such as first responders 
and military members, to securely access and manage valuable resources and applications 
under certain conditions.  At the same time it prevents others, who are unauthorized, 
access to the same resources and applications.  The proposed architecture lays out the 
blueprints for three major components of a security enclave: the location-verification 
application, user authentication mechanism and the security enclave construct that 
contains the valuable resources and applications. 
The first component is the location-verification application.  This is an Android 
application that can either check GPS coordinates or the Cell ID of the BTS to which the 
MCD is connected, or both.  The application crosschecks this with a list containing 
authorized coordinates or Cell IDs before allowing the user to attempt the second form of 
authentication.  The code for this application is explained in detail and included in this 
thesis. 
The second component is the authentication mechanism.  This component can 
only be accessed after being properly validated by the location verification application.  
This mechanism uses a challenge and response method similar to that of the GSM 
authentication process.  The challenge is created using an algorithm (COMP128) that is 
compatible to the A3 algorithm used in the GSM network.  This challenge is sent to the 
SIM card of the device where a response will be generated in similar fashion.  Only 
authorized SIM cards will generate an appropriate response that confirms authentication.   
Upon location verification and user authentication, the mobile security enclave is 
accessible to the user.  The enclave can take many forms, but this thesis describes the 




resources or applications to which the user is allowed access.  The protected assets are 
readily accessible and transitioning from one to another is similar to that of changing 
activities in an Android application. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Besides the architecture described in this thesis, there are a few general areas that 
require further study.  The first area focuses on back-end network integration, specifically 
pursuing other services or databases that aren’t local to the device, encryption, and 
establishment of an update mechanism.  Another area of interest is component integration 
to include use of removable storage devices.  Finally, there are a few recommended 
software areas to research such as continued location verification and a method to avoid 
hard coding the application with authorizations. Each of these areas is described in 
greater detail in the following sub-sections.  Addressing these concerns will ensure a 
product that is more robust, more flexible, and more appropriate for deployment. 
1. Network Integration 
The entire architecture is designed to operate independently of a back-end 
network.  This is possible by installing all required resources and applications on the 
device.  This is useful considering many occasions that require first responder support 
occur in environments where back-end networks are non-existent.  This concept also aids 
in coordination amongst mobile ad-hoc networks that are not tied to dedicated 
infrastructures. 
This does not mean that mobile secure enclaves can only exist in these types of 
networks.  Further network integration research and programming can significantly 
broaden enclave use and capabilities.  One such capability is to automatically push 
updates to all, or specific, MCDs connected to a network.  Currently, the architecture 
requires any changes to be done manually in the application, which are then distributed 
manually to each device.  With an automatic update method, changes to devices can 
occur in real-time, without user intervention, and with minimal delay in service. 
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Accessing databases and other services that cannot be installed on individual 
devices is another example of proposed network integration.  Although operating 
autonomously has many advantages, the devices have a finite amount of processing 
power and memory.  The ability to access resources other than what’s on the device has 
merit but requires additional study to ensure proper access controls are in place. 
Encryption of data is required when transmitting traffic between MCDs and the 
BTS since it is being sent through the air, susceptible to eavesdroppers.  GSM currently 
uses the A5 algorithm for its encryption of individual packets.  Further study will require 
incorporating the same method or one that is sufficient for the architecture, as well as the 
sensitivity of the information being transmitted.  Commercial products are available to 
provide other encryption mechanisms; these may provide further confidentiality support. 
2. Component Integration 
The most important aspect of component integration is that of removable storage.  
It is logically possible to utilize devices such as microSD cards to store data such as 
authorization lists or resources for the enclave.  Further research and programming is 
required to ensure the security is strong enough for the use of such devices.  In particular, 
unauthorized personnel should not be able to access data on these removable storage 
devices. 
As the proof-of-concept implementation accesses local information regarding 
authorized geo-locations or Cell IDs, care must be taken to ensure any production system 
does not allow the user to access such information directly and thereby bypass the intent 
of the access controls. 
3. Software Integration 
There are two functions in this architecture that need further implementation.  The 
first is implementing continuous verification of the device location.  The moment the 




continuously run verification in the background to ensure the device doesn’t leave the 
authorized area.  If it does, there should also be an, automatic, non-circumventable 
method, to exit the enclave. 
The second function requires determining alternate means of hard coding the 
components of the authentication mechanisms and enclave.  Currently the Cell ID list and 
authorized GPS coordinates are written directly into the application, as indicated above.  
This should be avoided, not just for security concerns, but also to make updating the 
enclaves a much simpler process.  This alternate method should work in both cases in 
which there is and is not connection to a back-end network.  
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APPENDIX A.  MAIN ACTIVITY 
/****************************************** 
 *  Main.java 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: Entry point for application. 
 *   Calls CIDActivity & GPSActivity  












public class Main extends Activity implements OnClickListener { 
    /** Called when the activity is first created. */ 
     
 Button gpsButton, cidButton, userButton; 
  
 @Override 
   public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
         super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
         setContentView(R.layout.main); 
         
         setConnections(); 
 } 
 
 private void setConnections( ) { 
          
      gpsButton = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.gpsBtn); 
         cidButton = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.cidBtn); 
         userButton = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.userBtn); 
      
      gpsButton.setOnClickListener(this); 
      cidButton.setOnClickListener(this); 
      userButton.setOnClickListener(this); 
 
     } 
 
 public void onClick(View v) { 
      
      Button clickedBtn = (Button) v; 
         if (clickedBtn == gpsButton) { 
    // calls GPSActivity 
        Main.this.startActivity(new Intent(Main.this,   
    GPSActivity.class)); 
    }  
       else if (clickedBtn == cidButton) { 
       
    // calls CIDActivity 
        Main.this.startActivity(new Intent(Main.this,   
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    CIDActivity.class)); 
       
       } else if (clickedBtn == userButton) { 
       
    Main.this.startActivity(new Intent(Main.this,   
    UserIDActivity.class)); 
       } 




APPENDIX B.  MAIN XML 
<!--****************************************** 
 *  main.xml 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: Provide xml format for    
 *  Main activity.  Contains three buttons  
 *  and two text views. 
 ********************************************--> 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LinearLayout xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 
 android:orientation="vertical" 
     android:layout_width="fill_parent" 
     android:layout_height="fill_parent" 
     android:gravity="center"> 
     
     <TextView 
      android:layout_height="wrap_content"  
      android:textAppearance="?android:attr/textAppearanceLarge"  
      android:id="@+id/textView1"  
      android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
      android:text="Location-verification"/> 
 
 <Button  
         android:id="@+id/gpsBtn" 
         android:text="Get coords"  
         android:textSize="10pt" 
         android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
         android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
  android:layout_margin="20dp"/> 
 
     <Button  
         android:id="@+id/cidBtn" 
         android:text="Get CellID"  
         android:textSize="10pt" 
         android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
         android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
         android:layout_margin="20dp"/> 
         
     <TextView 
      android:layout_height="wrap_content"  
      android:textAppearance="?android:attr/textAppearanceLarge"  
      android:id="@+id/textView1"  
      android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
      android:text="User/device Identification"/> 
         
  <Button  
         android:id="@+id/userBtn" 
         android:text="Get ID"  
         android:textSize="10pt" 
         android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
         android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
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APPENDIX C.  GPS ACTIVITY 
/****************************************** 
 *  GPSActivity.java 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: GPS coordinates activity. 
 *   Obtains last known GPS coordinates 
 *   of device.  Displays the coords to 
 *   user.  Calculates whether coords 
 *   are in or out of defined location. 
 *   Will call AuthActivity if they are, 
 *   will close activity if they are not. 
















public class GPSActivity extends Activity implements OnClickListener { 
  
 static final String BLANK = ""; 
  
 LocationManager locMgr; 
   Button getLoc, authBtn, authBtn2; 
     TextView LatView, LonView; 
 double lat, lon, NWlat, NWlon, NElat, NElon, SElat, SElon, SWlat, SWlon; 
 int precision;  //Used to truncate double 
 
 public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
         super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
         setContentView(R.layout.gps); 
 
         setConnections(); 
         
      locMgr = (LocationManager)getSystemService(LOCATION_SERVICE); 
      
      // Registering for location updates 
      locMgr.requestLocationUpdates(LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER, 10000, 
   10000.0f, onLocationChange); 
     } 
  
 @Override 
 public void onClick(View view) { 
   
  Button clickedBtn = (Button) view; 
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  if (clickedBtn == getLoc) { 
    
   // Calls the following function to output gps coords as  
   // Java double into the text view "Coords" 
   insertLocation(); 
    
  } else if (clickedBtn == authBtn) { 
    
   authenticate(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 private void setConnections( ) {   
   
  getLoc = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.getLoc);  
  authBtn = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.authBtn); 
   
  getLoc.setOnClickListener(this); 
  authBtn.setOnClickListener(this); 
   
  // text view in gps.xml, coords will be printed here 
  LatView = (TextView) this.findViewById(R.id.Latitude); 
  LonView = (TextView) this.findViewById(R.id.Longitude); 
 } 
 
 // Retrieves, formats & prints location 
 private void insertLocation() { 
  Location loc = locMgr.getLastKnownLocation 
   (LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER); 
 
  if (loc == null) { 
   Toast.makeText(this, "No location available",    
    Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
  } else { 
   lat = loc.getLatitude(); 
   lon = loc.getLongitude(); 
    
   // following two lines being used to truncate double 
   precision = 1000000; 
   lat = Math.floor(lat * precision +.5)/precision; 
   lon = Math.floor(lon * precision +.5)/precision; 
    
    
   TextView myView1 = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.Latitude); 
   myView1.setText("" + lat); 
 
   TextView myView2 = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.Longitude); 
   myView2.setText("" + lon); 
  } 
 } 
 
private void authenticate() { 
   
  Location loc = locMgr.getLastKnownLocation 
   (LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER); 
 
  if (loc == null) { 
   Toast.makeText(this, "No location available",    
    Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
  } else { 
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   lat = loc.getLatitude(); 
   lon = loc.getLongitude(); 
    
   // following two lines being used to truncate double 
   precision = 1000000; 
   lat = Math.floor(lat * precision +.5)/precision; 
   lon = Math.floor(lon * precision +.5)/precision; 
    
   // Authorized GPS location by four corners 
   NWlat = 36.621111; 
   NWlon = -121.904167; 
   NElat = 36.621389; 
   NElon = -121.818056; 
   SElat = 36.567222; 
   SElon = -121.817500; 
   SWlat = 36.570833; 
   SWlon = -121.903056; 
    
   // calculation to determine location authorization 
   if ((lat < NWlat) && (lat < NElat) && 
     (lat > SWlat) && (lat > SElat) && 
     (lon > NWlon) && (lon > SWlon) && 
     (lon < SElon) && (lon < NElon) ) { 
     
    Toast.makeText(this, "Authorized",    
     Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
    GPSActivity.this.startActivity(new    
     Intent(GPSActivity.this, 
     AuthActivity.class)); 
    
   } else { 
    
    Toast.makeText(this, "Unauthorized",    
     Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
    GPSActivity.this.finish( ); 
    
   } 
    
  } 
 } 
 // Required code for registering for GPS location retrieval 
 private LocationListener onLocationChange = new LocationListener() { 
  public void onLocationChanged(Location location) { 
   // required for interface, not used 
  } 
 
  public void onProviderEnabled(String provider) { 
   // required for interface, not used 
  } 
  @Override 
  public void onProviderDisabled(String arg0) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
    
  } 
  @Override 
  public void onStatusChanged(String provider, int status, Bundle  
   extras) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
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APPENDIX D.  GPS XML 
<!--****************************************** 
 *  gps.xml 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: Provide xml format for    
 *  GPSActivity.  Contains two buttons  
 *  and four text views. 
 *  
*******************************************--> 
 







  <Button  
        android:id="@+id/getLoc 
  android:text="Get coords" 
  android:textSize="10pt" 
  android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
  android:layout_height="wrap_content” 
  android:layout_margin="20dp"/> 
 
 <LinearLayout 
      android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
     android:layout_width="fill_parent" 
      android:layout_marginLeft="20dp" 
      android:layout_marginRight="20dp" 
      android:layout_marginBottom="10dp"> 
  
  <TextView 
         android:text="Latitude:  " 
          android:textSize="10pt" 
          android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
          android:layout_height="wrap_content"/> 
          
  <TextView 
   android:id="@+id/Latitude" 
          android:text="" 
          android:textSize="8pt" 
          android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
          android:layout_height="wrap_content" 




  android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
  android:layout_width="fill_parent" 
  android:layout_marginLeft="20dp" 
  android:layout_marginRight="20dp" 
  android:layout_marginBottom="10dp"> 
     
  <TextView 
   android:text="Longitude:  " 
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         android:textSize="10pt" 
         android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
         android:layout_height="wrap_content"/> 
          
  <TextView 
   android:id="@+id/Longitude" 
         android:text="" 
         android:textSize="8pt" 
         android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
         android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
         android:textColor="#FFFFFF"/> 
 </LinearLayout> 
 
 <Button  
         android:id="@+id/authBtn" 
         android:text="Authenticate"  
         android:textSize="10pt" 
         android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
         android:layout_height="wrap_content" 




APPENDIX E.  MANIFEST 
<!--  ****************************************** 
 *  Thesis Manifest.xml 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: Provides manifest for location- 
 *  verification application. 
 * 
 * Permissions: 
 *  ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 
 *  ACCESS_COURSE_LOCATION 
 *  READ_PHONE_STATE 
 * 
 * Activities: 
 *  GPSActivity 
 *  CIDActivity 
 *  AuthActivity 
 *  
******************************************* --> 
 






 <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="4" /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_COURSE_LOCATION" 
  /> 
 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE"/> 
      
 <application android:icon="@drawable/icon" 
  android:label="@string/app_name"> 
         <activity  android:name=".Main" 
                        android:label="@string/app_name"> 
   <intent-filter> 
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" /> 
    <category android:name="android.intent. 
     category.LAUNCHER" /> 
              </intent-filter> 
         </activity> 
  <activity android:name="GPSActivity"/> 
  <activity android:name="CIDActivity"/> 
  <activity android:name="UserIDActivity"/> 
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APPENDIX F.  CID ACTIVITY 
/****************************************** 
 *  CIDActivity.java 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: Cell ID activity.  Obtains  
 *   Cell ID of the device, displays 
 *   the ID to the user and verifies it. 
 *   If ID is authorized, will call  
 *   AuthActivity, quits activity 
 *   otherwise.  Also notifies user if 
 *   no Cell ID is available. 













import android.widget.Toast;  
 
public class CIDActivity extends Activity implements OnClickListener { 
  
 GsmCellLocation location; 
     int cellID, lac; 
 Button getID, authBtn, authBtn2; 
 
 @Override 
 public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
 
  super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
  setContentView(R.layout.cid); 
   
  setConnections(); 
 } 
  
 private void setConnections() { 
   
  getID = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.getID); 
  authBtn = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.authBtn); 
   
  getID.setOnClickListener(this); 
  authBtn.setOnClickListener(this); 
     
} 
 public void onClick(View v) { 
   
  Button clickedBtn = (Button) v; 
  TelephonyManager tm = (TelephonyManager)     
   getSystemService(TELEPHONY_SERVICE); 
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  GsmCellLocation loc = (GsmCellLocation) tm.getCellLocation(); 
  cellID = loc.getCid(); 
  lac = loc.getLac(); 
   
  if (clickedBtn == getID) { 
    
   // cellID of a "-1" in Android means there is no CellID  
    available 
   if (cellID == -1) { 
    TextView myView1 = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.CID); 
    myView1.setText("No CellID available"); 
   } else { 
    TextView myView1 = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.CID); 
    myView1.setText("" + cellID); 
   } 
    
   // lac of a "-1" in Android means there is no lac   
    available 
   if (lac == -1) { 
    TextView myView1 = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.LAC); 
    myView1.setText("No LAC available"); 
   } else { 
    TextView myView1 = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.LAC); 
    myView1.setText("" + lac); 
  } 
  } else if (clickedBtn == authBtn) { 
    
   // cellID of "2" is authorized, will allow user to   
    authenticate 
   if (cellID == 2) { 
    CIDActivity.this.startActivity(new    
    Intent(CIDActivity.this, AuthActivity.class)); 
   // closes activity if cellID not authorized 
   } else { 
    Toast.makeText(this, "Unauthorized CellID",   
     Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
    CIDActivity.this.finish( ); 
   } 




APPENDIX G.  CID XML 
<!--  ****************************************** 
 *  cid.xml 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: Provide xml format for    
 *  CIDActivity.  Contains two buttons  
 *  and four text views. 
 * ******************************************* --> 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LinearLayout 
 xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 
   android:gravity="center" 
   android:orientation="vertical" 
   android:layout_width="fill_parent" 
   android:layout_height="fill_parent"> 
    
   <Button  
         android:id="@+id/getID" 
         android:text="Get Cell ID/LAC"  
         android:textSize="10pt" 
         android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
         android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
         android:layout_margin="20dp"/> 
     
      <LinearLayout 
       android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
       android:layout_width="fill_parent" 
       android:layout_marginLeft="20dp" 
       android:layout_marginRight="20dp" 
       android:layout_marginBottom="10dp"> 
   <TextView 
           android:text="Cell ID:  " 
           android:textSize="10pt" 
           android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
           android:layout_height="wrap_content"/> 
   <TextView 
    android:id="@+id/CID" 
           android:text="" 
           android:textSize="8pt" 
           android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
           android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
           android:textColor="#FFFFFF"/> 
  </LinearLayout> 
   
   <LinearLayout 
       android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
       android:layout_width="fill_parent" 
   android:layout_marginLeft="20dp" 
       android:layout_marginRight="20dp" 
       android:layout_marginBottom="10dp"> 
       <TextView 
           android:text="LAC:  " 
           android:textSize="10pt" 
           android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
    android:layout_height="wrap_content"/> 
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   <TextView 
    android:id="@+id/LAC" 
           android:text="" 
           android:textSize="8pt" 
           android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
           android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
           android:textColor="#FFFFFF"/> 
  </LinearLayout> 
 
  <Button  
          android:id="@+id/authBtn" 
          android:text="Authenticate"  
          android:textSize="10pt" 
          android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
          android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
          android:layout_margin="20dp"/> 
</LinearLayout> 
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APPENDIX H.  AUTH ACTIVITY 
/****************************************** 
 *  AuthActivity.java 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: Authentication activity. 
 *   Step-off activity for future 
 *   authentication mechanism.  Contains 











public class AuthActivity extends Activity implements OnClickListener { 
  
 Button authBtn; 
  
 @Override 
 public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
  super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
  setContentView(R.layout.auth); 
   
  setConnections(); 
 } 
 
 private void setConnections() { 
   
  authBtn = (Button) this.findViewById(R.id.authBtn); 
  authBtn.setOnClickListener(this); 
    
 } 
  
 public void onClick(View v) { 
   
  Toast.makeText(this, "Success, opening enclave",    
   Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
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APPENDIX I.  AUTH XML 
<!--****************************************** 
 *  auth.xml 
 * 
 * Author: Kevin LaFrenier 
 * Date: June 2011 
 * Purpose: Provide xml format for    
 *  AuthActivity.  Contains one button  
 *  and one text view. 
 ********************************************--> 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LinearLayout 
 xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 
   android:orientation="vertical" 
   android:layout_width="fill_parent" 
   android:layout_height="fill_parent" 
   android:gravity="center"> 
   
   <TextView 
      android:layout_height="wrap_content"  
      android:textAppearance="?android:attr/textAppearanceLarge"  
      android:id="@+id/textView1"  
      android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
      android:text="Authentication"/> 
      
   <Button  
         android:id="@+id/authBtn" 
         android:text="Authenticate"  
         android:textSize="10pt" 
         android:layout_width="wrap_content"  
         android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
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APPENDIX J.  A3/A8 ALGORITHM 
/* An implementation of the GSM A3A8 algorithm.  (Specifically, COMP128.)  
 * 
 * Copyright 1998, Marc Briceno, Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner. 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * For expository purposes only.  Coded in C merely because C is a much 
 * more precise, concise form of expression for these purposes.  See Judge 
 * Patel if you have any problems with this... 
 * Of course, it’s only authentication, so it should be exportable for the 
 * usual boring reasons. 
 * 
 * 
 * This software is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 
 * the following conditions are aheared to. 
 * Copyright remains the authors' and as such any Copyright notices in 
 * the code are not to be removed. 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND 
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 
 * SUCH DAMAGE. 
 *  
 * The license and distribution terms for any publicly available version or 
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be 
 * copied and put under another distribution license 
 * [including the GNU Public License.] 
 */ 
 
typedef unsigned char Byte; 
 
#include <stdio.h> 
/* #define TEST */ 
  
/* 
 * rand[0..15]: the challenge from the base station 
 * key[0..15]: the SIM's A3/A8 long-term key Ki 
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 * simoutput[0..11]: what you would get back if you fed rand and key to a 
  * real 
 * SIM. 
 * 
 *   The GSM spec states that simoutput[0..3] is SRES, 
 *   and simoutput[4..11] is Kc (the A5 session key). 
 *   (See GSM 11.11, Section 8.16.  See also the leaked document 
 *   referenced below.) 
 *   Note that Kc is bits 74..127 of the COMP128 output, followed by 10 
 *   zeros. 
 *   In other words, A5 is keyed with only 54 bits of entropy. This 
 *   represents a deliberate weakening of the key used for voice privacy 
 *   by a factor of over 1000. 
 *  
 * Verified with a Pacific Bell Schlumberger SIM.  Your mileage may vary. 
 * 
 * Marc Briceno <marc@scard.org>, Ian Goldberg <iang@cs.berkeley.edu>, 
 * and David Wagner <daw@cs.berkeley.edu> 
 */ 
 
void A3A8(/* in */ Byte rand[16], /* in */ Byte key[16], 
 /* out */ Byte simoutput[12]); 
 
/* The compression tables. */ 
static const Byte table_0[512] = { 
        102,177,186,162,  2,156,112, 75, 55, 25,  8, 12,251,193,246,188, 
        109,213,151, 53, 42, 79,191,115,233,242,164,223,209,148,108,161, 
        252, 37,244, 47, 64,211,  6,237,185,160,139,113, 76,138, 59, 70, 
         67, 26, 13,157, 63,179,221, 30,214, 36,166, 69,152,124,207,116, 
        247,194, 41, 84, 71,  1, 49, 14, 95, 35,169, 21, 96, 78,215,225, 
        182,243, 28, 92,201,118,  4, 74,248,128, 17, 11,146,132,245, 48, 
        149, 90,120, 39, 87,230,106,232,175, 19,126,190,202,141,137,176, 
        250, 27,101, 40,219,227, 58, 20, 51,178, 98,216,140, 22, 32,121, 
         61,103,203, 72, 29,110, 85,212,180,204,150,183, 15, 66,172,196, 
         56,197,158,  0,100, 45,153,  7,144,222,163,167, 60,135,210,231, 
        174,165, 38,249,224, 34,220,229,217,208,241, 68,206,189,125,255, 
        239, 54,168, 89,123,122, 73,145,117,234,143, 99,129,200,192, 82, 
        104,170,136,235, 93, 81,205,173,236, 94,105, 52, 46,228,198,  5, 
         57,254, 97,155,142,133,199,171,187, 50, 65,181,127,107,147,226, 
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        184,218,131, 33, 77, 86, 31, 44, 88, 62,238, 18, 24, 43,154, 23, 
         80,159,134,111,  9,114,  3, 91, 16,130, 83, 10,195,240,253,119, 
        177,102,162,186,156,  2, 75,112, 25, 55, 12,  8,193,251,188,246, 
        213,109, 53,151, 79, 42,115,191,242,233,223,164,148,209,161,108, 
         37,252, 47,244,211, 64,237,  6,160,185,113,139,138, 76, 70, 59, 
         26, 67,157, 13,179, 63, 30,221, 36,214, 69,166,124,152,116,207, 
        194,247, 84, 41,  1, 71, 14, 49, 35, 95, 21,169, 78, 96,225,215, 
        243,182, 92, 28,118,201, 74,  4,128,248, 11, 17,132,146, 48,245, 
         90,149, 39,120,230, 87,232,106, 19,175,190,126,141,202,176,137, 
         27,250, 40,101,227,219, 20, 58,178, 51,216, 98, 22,140,121, 32, 
        103, 61, 72,203,110, 29,212, 85,204,180,183,150, 66, 15,196,172, 
        197, 56,  0,158, 45,100,  7,153,222,144,167,163,135, 60,231,210, 
        165,174,249, 38, 34,224,229,220,208,217, 68,241,189,206,255,125, 
         54,239, 89,168,122,123,145, 73,234,117, 99,143,200,129, 82,192, 
        170,104,235,136, 81, 93,173,205, 94,236, 52,105,228, 46,  5,198, 
        254, 57,155, 97,133,142,171,199, 50,187,181, 65,107,127,226,147, 
        218,184, 33,131, 86, 77, 44, 31, 62, 88, 18,238, 43, 24, 23,154, 
        159, 80,111,134,114,  9, 91,  3,130, 16, 10, 83,240,195,119,253 
    }, table_1[256] = { 
         19, 11, 80,114, 43,  1, 69, 94, 39, 18,127,117, 97,  3, 85, 43, 
         27,124, 70, 83, 47, 71, 63, 10, 47, 89, 79,  4, 14, 59, 11,  5, 
         35,107,103, 68, 21, 86, 36, 91, 85,126, 32, 50,109, 94,120,  6, 
         53, 79, 28, 45, 99, 95, 41, 34, 88, 68, 93, 55,110,125,105, 20, 
         90, 80, 76, 96, 23, 60, 89, 64,121, 56, 14, 74,101,  8, 19, 78, 
         76, 66,104, 46,111, 50, 32,  3, 39,  0, 58, 25, 92, 22, 18, 51, 
         57, 65,119,116, 22,109,  7, 86, 59, 93, 62,110, 78, 99, 77, 67, 
         12,113, 87, 98,102,  5, 88, 33, 38, 56, 23,  8, 75, 45, 13, 75, 
         95, 63, 28, 49,123,120, 20,112, 44, 30, 15, 98,106,  2,103, 29, 
         82,107, 42,124, 24, 30, 41, 16,108,100,117, 40, 73, 40,  7,114, 
         82,115, 36,112, 12,102,100, 84, 92, 48, 72, 97,  9, 54, 55, 74, 
        113,123, 17, 26, 53, 58,  4,  9, 69,122, 21,118, 42, 60, 27, 73, 
        118,125, 34, 15, 65,115, 84, 64, 62, 81, 70,  1, 24,111,121, 83, 
        104, 81, 49,127, 48,105, 31, 10,  6, 91, 87, 37, 16, 54,116,126, 
         31, 38, 13,  0, 72,106, 77, 61, 26, 67, 46, 29, 96, 37, 61, 52, 
        101, 17, 44,108, 71, 52, 66, 57, 33, 51, 25, 90,  2,119,122, 35 
    }, table_2[128] = { 
         52, 50, 44,  6, 21, 49, 41, 59, 39, 51, 25, 32, 51, 47, 52, 43, 
         37,  4, 40, 34, 61, 12, 28,  4, 58, 23,  8, 15, 12, 22,  9, 18, 
         55, 10, 33, 35, 50,  1, 43,  3, 57, 13, 62, 14,  7, 42, 44, 59, 
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         62, 57, 27,  6,  8, 31, 26, 54, 41, 22, 45, 20, 39,  3, 16, 56, 
         48,  2, 21, 28, 36, 42, 60, 33, 34, 18,  0, 11, 24, 10, 17, 61, 
         29, 14, 45, 26, 55, 46, 11, 17, 54, 46,  9, 24, 30, 60, 32,  0, 
         20, 38,  2, 30, 58, 35,  1, 16, 56, 40, 23, 48, 13, 19, 19, 27, 
         31, 53, 47, 38, 63, 15, 49,  5, 37, 53, 25, 36, 63, 29,  5,  7 
    }, table_3[64] = { 
          1,  5, 29,  6, 25,  1, 18, 23, 17, 19,  0,  9, 24, 25,  6, 31, 
         28, 20, 24, 30,  4, 27,  3, 13, 15, 16, 14, 18,  4,  3,  8,  9, 
         20,  0, 12, 26, 21,  8, 28,  2, 29,  2, 15,  7, 11, 22, 14, 10, 
         17, 21, 12, 30, 26, 27, 16, 31, 11,  7, 13, 23, 10,  5, 22, 19 
    }, table_4[32] = { 
         15, 12, 10,  4,  1, 14, 11,  7,  5,  0, 14,  7,  1,  2, 13,  8, 
         10,  3,  4,  9,  6,  0,  3,  2,  5,  6,  8,  9, 11, 13, 15, 12 
    }, *table[5] = { table_0, table_1, table_2, table_3, table_4 }; 
 
/* 
 * This code derived from a leaked document from the GSM standards. 
 * Some missing pieces were filled in by reverse-engineering a working 
SIM. 
 * We have verified that this is the correct COMP128 algorithm. 
 *  
 * The first page of the document identifies it as 
 *  _Technical Information: GSM System Security Study_. 
 *  10-1617-01, 10th June 1988. 
 * The bottom of the title page is marked 
 *  Racal Research Ltd. 
 *  Worton Drive, Worton Grange Industrial Estate, 
 *  Reading, Berks. RG2 0SB, England. 
 *  Telephone: Reading (0734) 868601   Telex: 847152 
 * The relevant bits are in Part I, Section 20 (pages 66--67).  Enjoy! 
 *  
 * Note: There are three typos in the spec (discovered by 
 * reverse-engineering). 
 * First, "z = (2 * x[n] + x[n]) mod 2^(9-j)" should clearly read 
 * "z = (2 * x[m] + x[n]) mod 2^(9-j)". 
 * Second, the "k" loop in the "Form bits from bytes" section is severely 
 * botched: the k index should run only from 0 to 3, and clearly the 
range 
 * on "the (8-k)th bit of byte j" is also off (should be 0..7, not 1..8, 
 * to be consistent with the subsequent section). 
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 * Third, SRES is taken from the first 8 nibbles of x[], not the last 8 
as 
 * claimed in the document.  (And the document does not specify how Kc is 
 * derived, but that was also easily discovered with reverse 
engineering.) 
 * All of these typos have been corrected in the following code. 
 */ 
 
void A3A8(/* in */ Byte rand[16], /* in */ Byte key[16], 
 /* out */ Byte simoutput[12]) 
{ 
 Byte x[32], bit[128]; 
 int i, j, k, l, m, n, y, z, next_bit; 
 
 /* ( Load RAND into last 16 bytes of input ) */ 
 for (i=16; i<32; i++) 
  x[i] = rand[i-16]; 
 
 /* ( Loop eight times ) */ 
 for (i=1; i<9; i++) { 
  /* ( Load key into first 16 bytes of input ) */ 
  for (j=0; j<16; j++) 
   x[j] = key[j]; 
  /* ( Perform substitutions ) */ 
  for (j=0; j<5; j++) 
   for (k=0; k<(1<<j); k++) 
    for (l=0; l<(1<<(4-j)); l++) { 
     m = l + k*(1<<(5-j)); 
     n = m + (1<<(4-j)); 
     y = (x[m]+2*x[n]) % (1<<(9-j)); 
     z = (2*x[m]+x[n]) % (1<<(9-j)); 
     x[m] = table[j][y]; 
     x[n] = table[j][z]; 
    } 
  /* ( Form bits from bytes ) */ 
  for (j=0; j<32; j++) 
   for (k=0; k<4; k++) 
    bit[4*j+k] = (x[j]>>(3-k)) & 1; 
  /* ( Permutation but not on the last loop ) */ 
  if (i < 8) 
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   for (j=0; j<16; j++) { 
    x[j+16] = 0; 
    for (k=0; k<8; k++) { 
     next_bit = ((8*j + k)*17) % 128; 
     x[j+16] |= bit[next_bit] << (7-k); 
    } 




  * ( At this stage the vector x[] consists of 32 nibbles. 
  *   The first 8 of these are taken as the output SRES. ) 
  */ 
 
 /* The remainder of the code is not given explicitly in the 
  * standard, but was derived by reverse-engineering. 
  */ 
 
 for (i=0; i<4; i++) 
  simoutput[i] = (x[2*i]<<4) | x[2*i+1]; 
 for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
  simoutput[4+i] = (x[2*i+18]<<6) | (x[2*i+18+1]<<2) 
    | (x[2*i+18+2]>>2); 
 simoutput[4+6] = (x[2*6+18]<<6) | (x[2*6+18+1]<<2); 





int hextoint(char x) 
{ 
 x = toupper(x); 
 if (x >= 'A' && x <= 'F') 
  return x-'A'+10; 
 else if (x >= '0' && x <= '9') 
  return x-'0'; 





int main(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 Byte rand[16], key [16], simoutput[12]; 
 int i; 
 
 if (argc != 3 || strlen(argv[1]) != 34 || strlen(argv[2]) != 34 
   || strncmp(argv[1], "0x", 2) != 0 
   || strncmp(argv[2], "0x", 2) != 0) { 
  fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s 0x<key> 0x<rand>\n", argv[0]); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 
 for (i=0; i<16; i++) 
  key[i] = (hextoint(argv[1][2*i+2])<<4) 
   | hextoint(argv[1][2*i+3]); 
 for (i=0; i<16; i++) 
  rand[i] = (hextoint(argv[2][2*i+2])<<4) 
    | hextoint(argv[2][2*i+3]); 
 A3A8(key, rand, simoutput); 
 printf("simoutput: "); 
 for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
  printf("%02X", simoutput[i]); 
 printf("\n"); 
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